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I. Introduction 
International law lacks the coherence that domestic law has. There is no world parlia-
ment, and judicial decisions, albeit binding, are not always respected. States seem to largely 
enjoy the discretion to shape international law according to their volition. Yet, quite paradox-
ically, and albeit not confined by any outer restraints, states feel inherently limited in their 
actions. 
The present Article would like to trace these inherent limits of international law. In order 
to do this, the Article will use a paradigm that constitutes the awarding platform for all other 
human rights1: the right to self-determination. Not by accident, in both human rights law 
cornerstone treaties, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the specific right is entrenched 
in the opening provision.2 As such, the Article will first deal with the question of whether the 
right to self-determination is subject to any limits. Subsequently, it will proceed to examine 
the repercussions for international law and interstate relations on a doctrinal and practical 
level. 
II. Inherent Self-Determination Limits 
Self-determination can be synopsized in the people’s quest for freedom and their desire to 
shape their own political, economic, and social future.3 The notion has deep historical roots.4 
Already from the beginning of the twentieth century and following World War I, the Ameri-
can President Woodrow Wilson supported the idea of ethnically identifiable peoples or nations 
governing themselves.5 
While Wilson’s vision was centered more on self-governance than self-determination,6 still, 
as the Aaland Islands case depicts,7 his vision contributed to the gradual consolidation of self-
determination as a factor in the various international decisions. 
After World War II, self-determination was normatively recognized, with its inclusion in 
the United Nations Charter, albeit still not defined and thus amorphous.8 The notion was 
 
 1. James E. Falkowski, Secessionary Self-Determination: A Jeffersonian Perspective, 9 B.U. INT’L L. J. 
209, 210–11 (1991). 
 2. Christopher J. Borgen, The Language of Law and the Practice of Politics: Great Powers and the 
Rhetoric of Self-Determination in the cases of Kosovo and South Ossetia, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 7 
(2009). 
 3. Susanna Mancini, Rethinking the Boundaries of Democratic Secession: Liberalism, Nationalism, 
and the Right of Minorities to Self-Determination, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 553, 554 (2008). 
 4. See e.g., Milena Sterio, On the Right to External Self-Determination: “Selfistans,” Secession, and the 
Great Powers’ Rule, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 137 (2010). 
 5. Anthony Whelan, Wilsonian Self-Determination and the Versailles Settlement, 43 INT’L & COMP. 
L.Q. 99, 99–101 (1994). 
 6. See JOSHUA CASTELLINO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SELF-DETERMINATION 15 (2000); MICHLA 
POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE: THE NEW DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED 
NATIONS 80 n.42 (1982). 
 7. THOMAS D. MUSGRAVE, SELF-DETERMINATION AND NATIONAL MINORITIES 32 (1997). 
 8. U.N. Charter arts. 1(2), 55. See also Alexandra Xanthaki, The Right to Self-Determination: Meaning 
and Scope, in MINORITIES, PEOPLE AND SELF-DETERMINATION 16 (Nazila Ghanea & Alexandra Xan-
thaki eds., 2005). 
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awarded the status of a “right” through the U.N. General Assembly Declaration against Co-
lonialism.9 Gradually, it expanded to include also an internal facet, aside from its external 
repercussions in the decolonization process. This internal facet referred to the need for all 
peoples to freely and fairly participate in the democratic process of governance.10 
In order to penetrate the non-change-prone international law structures,11 self-
determination has adopted a more flexible facet, more easily adaptable to the constantly 
changing economic, political, and security parameters.12 This means the inclusion of dialogue 
in any self-determination claims and the preference of bilateral, consensual solutions over 
unilateral measures.13 This bilateralism pervades not only the right itself, but also its limits. 
Any attempt to contravene this bilateralism is ultimately detrimental for international secu-
rity and legality.14 
Until now, the question of whether the right to self-determination applied depended on cri-
teria that did not have to do with any constraints embedded in the notion itself, but with ex-
ternal factors that had to be asserted. Without a specific repressive environment, not letting a 
certain people govern its fate,15 recourse to the right could not be supported.16 
The Arab Spring, namely the turmoil in the Arab world that led to protests and regime 
changes in a number of Arab countries,17 revealed first that self-determination is subject to 
limits and second, that these limits are inherent. By definition, self-determination is bound to 
be harnessed. This is not in order for self-determination to be subdued. Yet, like its other re-
 
 9. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 
(XV), U.N. DOC. A/RES/1514(XV) (Dec. 14, 1960). See also Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 
S.C.R. 217, ¶ 124 (Can.); Robert McCorquodale, Human Rights and Self-Determination, in THE NEW 
WORLD ORDER: SOVEREIGNTY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES 9, 11 
(Mortimer Sellers ed., 1996); Declaration on the Occasion of the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the 
United Nations, G.A. Res. 2627 (XXV), ¶ 6, U.N. DOC A/RES/2627(XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970); Human 
Rights Committee, General Comment 12, Article 1 (Twenty-first session, 1984), in Human Rights 
Instruments, Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Hu-
man Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 12 (1994); Jordan J. Paust, Nonstate Ac-
tor Participation in International Law and the Pretense of Exclusion, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 977, 983 
(2011). 
 10. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 46, 59 (1992). 
 11. ANNA MEIJKNECHT, TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY: THE POSITION OF MINORITIES AND 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 5–6 (2001). 
 12. CASTELLINO, supra note 6, at 18; Xanthaki, supra note 8, at 18; The Autocrat Has Fled, But the 
Danger of Civil War Remains, INDEPENDENT (June 6, 2011), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/leading-articles/leading-article-the-autocrat-has-fled-but-the-
danger-of-civil-war-remains-2293514.html; Marc Weller, Why the Legal Rules on Self-Determination 
Do Not Resolve Self-Determination Disputes, in SETTLING SELF-DETERMINATION DISPUTES: 
COMPLEX POWER-SHARING IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 17, 28 (Marc Weller & Barbara Metzger eds., 
2008). 
 13. UNESCO, Rep. of the Int’l Conference of Experts Held in Barcelona, The Implementation of the 
Right to Self-Determination as a Contribution to Conflict Prevention, Nov. 21–27, 1998 (Michael C. 
van Walt van Praag & Onno Seroo eds.,1999). 
 14. Marc Weller, Settling Self-Determination Conflicts: Recent Developments, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 111, 
114 (2009). 
 15. Lee Seshagiri, Democratic Disobedience: Reconceiving Self-Determination and Secession at Interna-
tional Law, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 553, 556 (2010). 
 16. Weller, supra note 12, at 26; CASTELLINO, supra note 6, at 26, 28, 40. 
 17. Sarah Joseph, Social Media, Political Change, and Human Rights, 35 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
145 (2012). 
 The Quest for Self-Determination 
401 
lated, highly cherished value—freedom—self-determination can end up in anarchy if not 
properly put in the right dimensions.18 
In an effort to trace these inherent limits, the current note will examine two recent Arab 
Spring cases: Libya and Syria. These cases took place in close temporal vicinity and inside the 
same factual framework, yet merited totally different approaches from the international 
community. This renders the examination of the self-determination limits more palpable and 
telling regarding also interstate relations. 
A. The International Community and Libya 
In February 2011, violent demonstrations erupted in Libya against the Qaddafi regime.19 
The international community’s reaction was rather swift and decisive.20 In late February the 
U.N. Security Council convened and passed Resolution 1970.21 
The Resolution made note of the “gross and systematic violation of human rights” in Libya, 
and reiterated the state’s obligation to protect its citizens.22 The Resolution called upon the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) to intervene in case Libya appeared unwilling or unable 
to respect its citizens’ basic human rights.23 
Indeed, quite swiftly, the ICC prosecutor announced in the beginning of March that he 
would open an investigation in the case of Libya.24 The African Court on Human Rights fol-
lowed suit, by issuing in the end of March its first judgment, asking Libya to refrain from any 
action that would result in loss of life or violate the physical integrity of people.25 In May, the 
ICC Prosecutor requested the issuance of arrest warrants for Qaddafi, his son and the Head 
of the Intelligence for crimes against humanity.26 In June 2011, these warrants were issued.27 
 
 18. Seshagiri, supra note 15, at 557–58; UNESCO, supra note 13, at 13. 
 19. Anthony Shadid, Clashes in Libya Worsen as Army Crushes Dissent, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/19/world/africa/19libya.html?_r=1. 
 20. Angela Evans, U.N. Acts Swiftly on Libya, INTERPRETER (Mar. 1, 2011), 
http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2011/03/01/UNSC-Resolution-1970-Swift-Supported-and-
Surprising.aspx. 
 21. S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011). 
 22. Id. pmbl. See also Press Release, U.N. Secretary-General Special Adviser on the Prevention of Geno-
cide, Francis Deng, and Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, Edward Luck, on the Situ-
ation in Libya (Feb. 22, 2011), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/OSAPG,%20Special%20Advisers%20Statement%
20on%20Libya,%2022%20February%202011.pdf 
 23. Mehrdad Payandeh, With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility? The Concept of the Responsibil-
ity to Protect within the Process of International Lawmaking, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 469, 481 (2010); 
Edward Wyatt, Security Council Calls for War Crimes Inquiry in Libya, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/27/world/africa/27nations.html. 
 24. ICC Prosecutor to Open an Investigation in Libya, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT (Feb. 3, 2011), 
http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/comm%20a
nd%20ref/libya/Pages/statement%20020311.aspx; ICC to Launch Libya Probe, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 2, 
2011), http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2011/03/201132142735939241.html. 
 25. African Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
Order for Provisional Measures, App. No. 004/2011, ¶ 25 (Afr. Ct. on Hum. and Peoples’ Rts., March 
25, 2011), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4da59c082.pdf. 
 26. Press Release, Int’l Crim. Ct., ICC—ICC Prosecutor: Gaddafi Used His Absolute Authority to Com-
mit Crimes in Libya (May 16, 2011), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/icc0111/press%20releases/Pages/pr667.a
spx. 
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Amidst fighting between rebel forces and those loyal to Qaddafi, in mid-March, the U.N. 
Security Council convened again and passed Resolution 1973.28 Adopted under Chapter VII of 
the U.N. Charter, the resolution authorized member-states to take all measures to protect 
civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in Libya, tacitly endorsing the 
use of military means.29 
Moreover, in the course of a global-regional interaction,30 regional bodies convened almost 
in parallel with the U.N. Security Council. Thus, the African Union decided to remain seized 
of the matter, establishing the ad hoc High-Level Committee on Libya,31 the Arab League 
suspended Libya as a member,32 and the U.N. General Assembly suspended Libya’s member-
ship in the U.N. Human Rights Council.33 
These developments gave the wrong impression that the whole international community 
stood opposite Libya. This rendered a highly bipolar, Armageddon-like character to a poten-
tial confrontation, augmenting its ethical and actual dimensions and impact.34 
Libya’s suspension from the Human Rights Council was unanimous, but the representa-
tive of Venezuela stalled until the last moment in deciding whether to back it;35 actually Ven-
ezuela’s president, Hugo Chavez, was one of the few leaders who openly supported Qaddafi.36 
The ICC arrest warrants met the opposition of the African Union, which recommended its 
state members not to cooperate with the Court.37 
Resolution 1970 also enjoyed the support of states traditionally reluctant to endorse inter-
vention, such as Russia and China.38 Yet these states, joined by a number of other key states 
 
 27. Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Case No. ICC-01/11, Decision on the “Prosecutor’s Appli-
cation Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gad-
dafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi (June 27, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1099314.pdf. 
 28. S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011). 
 29. Michael N. Schmitt, Wings over Libya: The No-Fly Zone in Legal Perspective, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 
ONLINE 45 (2011). 
 30. U.N. Secretary-General, The Role of Regional and Subregional Arrangements in Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect, U.N. Doc. A/65/877–S/2011/393 (June 27, 2011). 
 31. African Union, Communique of the 265th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, 
PSC/PR/COMM.2(CCLXV) (Mar. 10, 2011) [hereinafter AU Communique]. 
 32. Matt Bradley & Charles Levinson, Arab League Urges Libya ‘No-Fly’ Zone, WALL ST. J. (Mar.14, 
2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704838804576196681609529882.html. 
 33. Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Suspends Libya from Human Rights Council, 
U.N. Press Release GA/11050 (Mar. 1, 2011), available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/ga11050.doc.htm. 
 34. James Pattison, The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention in Libya, 25 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 271 
(2011); David Clark, Libyan Intervention Was a Success, Despite the Aftermath’s Atrocities, 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 28, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/oct/28/intervention-libya-
success; François Heisbourg, Libya: A Small War with Big Consequences, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/30/opinion/30iht-edheisbourg30.html. 
 35. Eric Shawn, U.N. General Assembly Suspends Libya from Human Rights Council, FOX NEWS.COM 
(Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/03/01/general-assembly-suspends-libya-human-
rights-council/. 
 36. Simon Romero, Qaddafi Said to Accept Venezuelan Offer for Help, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/04/world/americas/04venezuela.html. 
 37. African Union Opposes Warrant for Qaddafi, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/03/world/africa/03african.html. 
 38. For the fact that this was perceived as a shift in China’s stance vis-à-vis international law and insti-
tutions and a more reserved position, see Evans, supra note 20. 
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like Germany, India and Brazil,39 abstained as to Resolution 1973 only some days after-
wards.40 All of these countries voiced concerns over the protracted conflict character and sta-
bility building potential of a unilaterally-imposed solution in the case of Libya.41 The African 
Union also expressed similar fears.42 
These fears proved substantial when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mili-
tary intervened in Libya in order to enforce the U.N. Resolution,43 and battles continued to be 
waged between rebels and Qaddafi forces on an indecisive scale.44 The Russian President lik-
ened the airstrikes to “crusades”45 and the Arab League Secretary-General, although continu-
ing to support the U.N. Libya Resolution, stated that the Arab League had consented to 
something different.46 This partial international recoil from the unilateral, military interven-
tion-line fostered by the Libya Resolution bolstered the view that internal self-determination 
in Libya should come as a result of bilateral talks and could not be unilaterally imposed. 
The U.N. Secretary-General, echoing previous remarks of other senior U.N. officials,47 as 
well as calls by African states and the African Union,48 underlined in July 2011 that no mili-
tary solution existed in the case of Libya and that parties should “engage in direct negotia-
tions” to end the impasse.49 As such, the international community’s stance started to change 
gradually, from one advocating Qaddafi’s removal, to one accepting his departure from power 
 
 39. Security Council Authorizes “All Necessary Measures” to Protect Civilians in Libya, U.N. NEWS 
CENTRE (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37808&Cr=libya&Cr1. 
 40. Michael Fullilove, China and the United Nations: The Stakeholder Spectrum, 34 WASH. Q. 63, 71 
(2011). 
 41. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya, Authorizing 
‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions, U.N. 
Press Release SC/10200 (Mar. 17, 2011), available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm; China Voices Misgivings about Libya “No 
Fly” Zone Plan, ALERTNET (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/china-voices-
misgivings-about-libya-no-fly-zone-plan/. 
 42. AU Communique, supra note 31. 
 43. Libya: NATO to Take Command of No-Fly Zone, BBC NEWS (Mar. 25, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12856665. 
 44. Gaye Davis, Libya Heading for Civil War—Dangor, INDEPENDENT ONLINE (Mar. 2, 2011), 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/libya-heading-for-civil-war-dangor-1.1034626. 
 45. Gleb Bryanski, Putin Likens U.N. Libya Resolution to Crusades, REUTERS (Mar. 21, 2011), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/21/us-libya-russia-idUSTRE72K3JR20110321. 
 46. Arab League Chief: We Respect U.N. Resolution on Libya Military Action, HAARETZ (Mar. 21, 2011), 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/world/arab-league-chief-we-respect-un-resolution-on-libya-military-
action-1.350888. 
 47. Press Release, Security Council, Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs, Briefing Security 
Council on Libya Situation, Says Negotiation Process Must Have Time ‘to Grow and Bear Fruit,’ 
U.N. Press Release SC/10297 (June 27, 2011), available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10297.doc.htm. 
 48. Britain, South Africa Disagree over Next Steps in Libya, REUTERS (July 18, 2011), 
http://af.reuters.com/article/libyaNews/idAFL6E7II0NU20110718?rpc=401&feedType=RSS&feedNa
me=libyaNews&rpc=401; AU Communique, supra note 31, ¶¶ 6–7. 
 49. Press Release, Secretary-General, “No Military Solution to Crisis in Libya,” Secretary-General 
Stresses in Message, Calling for Lasting Solution That Addresses Aspirations of Libyan People, 
U.N. Press Release SG/SM/13706-AFR/2211 (July 15, 2011), available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2011/sgsm13706.doc.htm. 
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under agreement,50 and ultimately to one allowing him to remain in Libya under certain con-
ditions.51 As expected, such a scenario did not find any accord with the ICC Prosecutor.52 
Yet, even after the fall of the Libyan despot, when seemingly things could be shaped as 
tabula rasa in an authoritative way, the United Nations continued to endorse a dialectical 
stance. Thus, a meeting was called to examine ways in which the international community 
could work together on the post-conflict phase.53 
Eventually, NATO military strikes continued, ending only after Qaddafi was overthrown 
and subsequently killed by a crowd during his efforts to flee and hide.54 Yet, the numbness 
and hesitance the international community had demonstrated regarding Libya55 had already 
put its stamp on the international community’s responsiveness to similar self-determination 
quests. The case of Syria will be elaborated in the next section. 
B. The International Community and Syria 
In Syria, the Arab Spring flowers did not sprout suddenly, but were the result of a gradual 
process. On January 26, Hasan Ali Akleh set himself on fire.56 On February 2, a group of 
twenty people in civilian clothing beat people who had been holding a candlelight vigil in 
support for Egyptian demonstrators.57 On February 5, hundreds of demonstrators called for 
the departure of Assad.58 On March 6, a number of young boys were arrested for writing slo-
gans supportive of the Arab Spring.59 After March 15, demonstrations became massive and 
took the form of an uprising.60 Thousands of civilians lost their lives.61 
Yet, in the case of Syria, the international community did not show the unilateral pulse 
and quick instincts it had demonstrated in the case of Libya. The U.N. Secretary-General in-
 
 50. Ewen MacAskill, U.S. and Libya in Face to Face Talks, GUARDIAN (July 18, 2011), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/19/us-libya-talks-tunisia. 
 51. Simon Tisdall, Can Gaddafi Really Stay in Libya and Cede All Power?, GUARDIAN (July 26, 2011), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jul/26/gaddafi-libya-power; Jonathan Steele, Libya’s 
Stalemate Shows It Is Time to Tempt Gaddafi Out, Not Blast Him Out, GUARDIAN (July 26, 2011), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jul/26/libya-gaddafi-war-nato-ceasefire. 
 52. Richard Norton-Taylor & Chris Stephen, Gaddafi Can’t Be Left in Libya, Says International Crimi-
nal Court, GUARDIAN (July 26, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/26/gaddafi-in-libya-
hague-icc. 
 53. U.N. Calls Urgent Meeting on Libya, BIG NEWS NETWORK (Aug. 24, 2011), 
http://feeds.bignewsnetwork.com/?sid=831780. 
 54. Mehrdad Payandeh, The United Nations, Military Intervention, and Regime Change in Libya, 52 
VA. J. INT’L L. 355, 358, 380 (2012); James Meikle, Muammar Gaddafi Is Dead, Says Libyan PM, 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/20/gaddafi-dead-says-libyan-
pm. 
 55. Payandeh, supra note 54, at 380–82. 
 56. Ali Sarihan, Is the Arab Spring in the Third Wave of Democratization? The Case of Syria and Egypt, 
3 TURK J. POL. 67, 72 (2012). 
 57. Lauren Williams, Syria Clamps Down on Dissent with Beatings and Arrests, GUARDIAN, (Feb. 24, 
2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/24/syria-crackdown-protest-arrests-beatings. 
 58. Sarihan, supra note 56, at 67, 72.  
 59. Joe Sterling, Daraa: The Spark That Lit the Syrian Flame, CNN (Mar. 1, 2012), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2012/03/01/world/meast/syria-crisis-beginnings/index.html.  
 60. Sarihan, supra note 56, at 67, 72. 
 61. Michelle Nichols, Syria Death Toll Likely near 70,000, says U.N. Rights Chief, REUTERS (Feb. 12, 
2013),http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/12/us-syria-crisis-un-idUSBRE91B19C20130212.  
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deed swiftly condemned the deaths in the beginning of the riots.62 Nevertheless, Syria’s can-
didacy for the U.N. Human Rights Council was not rejected, despite calls for the opposite.63 It 
was only deferred for a two-year time, following a Syrian agreement with Kuwait to swap 
candidacies for the Council.64 The U.N. Security Council did not issue any resolution,65 but 
only a presidential statement, five months after the outburst of violence, condemning Damas-
cus’ bloody crackdown on civilian protesters.66 The Arab League did not condemn the Syrian 
regime nor did it take any other action.67 The ICC did not even voice the need for any arrest 
warrants to be issued against the Syrian political and military echelon.68 
Rather, reaction on an international level was lukewarm. The U.N. Human Rights Council 
approved a fact-finding mission to Syria to explore possible human rights violations,69 and in 
July 2011 two of the U.N. Secretary-General’s advisers on issues of genocide and human 
rights protection actually voiced the possibility that “crimes against humanity may have been 
committed and continue to be committed in Syria.”70 
Countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States which had been active in the 
issue of military action against Libya, as well as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, ex-
pressed only their concern for the reports about the violence used by the Syrian regime 
against the demonstrators.71 No military scenario was put on the table regarding Syria and 
reactions were restricted to a bilateral level, where the United States and the European Un-
 
 62. Caroline Faraj, U.N. Secretary-General Condemns Reported Syrian Rioting Deaths, CNN (Mar. 18, 
2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-03-18/world/syria.riots_1_demonstrators-syrian-government-
syrian-authorities. 
 63. Syria Should Not Be Allowed on the U.N. Human Rights Council, CAIRO INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS STUDIES (Apr. 21, 2011), http://www.cihrs.org/?p=1414; Letter from African NGOs to African 
States re Syria’s Candidacy for the U.N. Human Rights Council, EGYPTIAN INITIATIVE FOR 
PERSONAL RIGHTS (Apr. 28, 2011), http://www.eipr.org/en/pressrelease/2011/04/28/1148. 
 64. Patrick Worsnip, Kuwait Elected to U.N. Rights Panel Instead of Syria, REUTERS (May 20, 2011), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/20/us-rights-un-council-idUSTRE74J5IO20110520. 
 65. Russia Says Opposed to Any U.N. Security Council Resolution on Syria, HAARETZ (June 9, 2011), 
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ion, on separate bases, imposed sanctions on Assad’s regime.72 Gradually, the regime was left 
to collapse on its own.73 
C. Assessing Self-Determination’s Limits 
The international community’s reaction in the case of Syria palpably depicts the inherent 
limits that chain and constrain any self-determination quests. It is important that the inter-
national community does not compromise its moral doctrinal stance, which is based upon the 
ideals of freedom, human life, and dignity, enshrined in all major human rights instru-
ments.74 The fact that in the case of Libya, the Security Council endorsed for the first time 
the “responsibility to protect” doctrine,75 demonstrates the international community’s resolu-
tion not to tolerate mass atrocities, even if that means that a military intervention has to take 
place. On the other hand, such intervention does not always bring the desired results as far 
as self-determination is concerned. Democratization is not always achieved and regional sta-
bility is not always ensured. This is partly due to the fact that self-determination cannot be 
achieved just through the imposition of outer, blitzkrieg solutions, but rather must result 
from the fermenting of certain conditions inside a society. 
For example, the Egyptian revolution was succeeded by a military government, postpone-
ment of elections, and a slow pace of political change.76 Even when such elections took place, 
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slavery or servitude.”).  
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the rise of Islamist powers posed the question of whether democracy is indeed feasible in all 
states and whether the overthrowing of a despot equals necessarily the inauguration of a pe-
riod of more freedom or ultimately serves the interests of the West.77 The will of Egypt’s new 
President to pass a constitution awarding broad powers to him sparked a new round of tur-
moil and violent protests.78 Likewise, in Tunisia, two years after the ousting of President Ben 
Ali, the country was still tormented by violence and high unemployment rates.79 
As past experience has demonstrated in regions like Eastern Europe,80 enthusiasm for 
democracy embodied in unilateral self-determination initiatives such as demonstrations, ri-
ots, and ultimately the overthrowing of a ruling cast, is positive and necessary for change. 
Yet, it is not enough on its own to yield that change. It has to be followed by bilateral concrete 
steps, aimed at strengthening, as in the cases of Egypt and Tunisia,81 civil society voices, ac-
celerating democratization and supporting internal dialogue and interstate interaction.82 
The inherent limits of self-determination have been diagnosed by the international com-
munity. In Libya, there was an attempt to solve the crisis through resort to unilateral 
measures, such as Security Council resolutions and a military intervention. Yet, this ap-
proach, pervasive of unilateralism, did not prove adequate once transplanted to the exigencies 
of a non-U.S. hegemonic world, with Russia trying to recapture its former power and states 
like China emerging in the international arena.83 Once military operations began, all lurking 
disagreements regarding the strategy that should be followed towards the Qaddafi regime 
came to the surface.84 This in turn damaged the legal grounds and efficiency of the expedition 
on an international and domestic level.85 
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Carrying the case of Libya in its collective sub-consciousness, the international community 
has appeared much less willing to intervene in Syria. The United States, France and the 
United Kingdom all have acquiesced to the Syrian people’s self-determination pleas and have 
acknowledged the Syrian opposition as the sole legitimate representative of the Syrian peo-
ple.86 Yet, at the same time, with their reluctance to militarily or more actively diplomatically 
intervene, world powers have made clear that self-determination has limits.87 These limits 
stem from the possible chaos that escorts anything new and fills with fear an international 
community that is anchored to stability and to the current status quo.88 
The unlimited fragmentation of states may lead to non-viable new states89 and this cannot 
be condoned by international law.90 Thus, for example, secession of Somaliland from Somalia 
has not been positively received,91 partly due to the fact that such secession would deprive 
Somalia of a region which could function as a stimulating factor for Somalia’s stability and 
the reorganization of its tattered state institutions.92 
In order for self-determination to apply, the international community has to be convinced 
that the creation of a new state is the only way to end a civil war, human rights abuses, or an 
occupation.93 Yet, even in these cases, the confrontational element embedded in unilateral 
initiatives can negatively impact international security and legality.94 This negative impact 
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can be traced in all three self-determination quests that have taken a prominent place in the 
international diplomatic and legal agenda over the last decade: Kosovo, South Sudan and the 
issue of Palestinian statehood. 
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of statehood has been supported by a large part of the in-
ternational community.95 Nevertheless, because it is not the product of a bilateral coordina-
tion with the mother-state of Serbia, Kosovo inherited problems of fighting. Moreover, it ap-
peared unable to control parts of its territory, in particular in districts where Serbians 
constituted the majority.96 Although unilaterally created, Kosovo had to grapple with issues 
of its sovereignty only through a bilateral track, involving talks with Serbia and the signing of 
an EU brokered bilateral agreement between the two sides.97 
South Sudan declared its independence in 2011, seceding from the state of Sudan. In the 
case of South Sudanese independence, there was an attempt for the two parties—Sudan and 
South Sudan—to engage in a bilateral approach. As such, independence came under an 
agreement with the mother-state of Sudan. In fact, Sudan’s support was deemed critical.98 
Still, even these bilateral steps did not ultimately erase frictions with Sudan regarding the 
border demarcation in an oil-rich frontier-territory.99 
Under this lens, the Palestinian U.N. statehood should be seen also on a broader security, 
political, and economic base. Self-determination has been acknowledged for the Palestini-
ans.100 A Palestinian state is endorsed by the United Nations and the wider international 
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community, but this should be the start and not the end of the Palestinian statehood jour-
ney.101 Self-determination should be coupled with stability.102 
Self-determination is not anymore based just on the assertion of the classical Montevideo 
statehood criteria, but also on other factors such as political and economic viability parame-
ters.103 In the case of Palestinian statehood, this is shared by all interested parties. The in-
ternational community has supplied financial aid to the Palestinians104 and has long docu-
mented the economic growth in the West Bank and Gaza.105 Israeli politicians have 
underlined the role of economic prosperity in regional Middle East stability,106 and economic 
cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority was included in the Oslo accords 
signed between Israel and the PLO.107 As for Palestinians, they have both aspired to achieve 
reconciliation between the Hamas and Fatah rival fractions108 as well as draw investments 
and economic help from Arab states.109 
It is these parameters that largely determine whether the international community will 
ultimately sanction secession. International law is silent on the legality of secession.110 Nev-
ertheless, self-determination is further limited by the assertion that any secession quests, 
both before as well as after their configuration, must be based on a bilateral, dialectic plat-
form.111 
Thus, in the case of Quebec, the Canadian Supreme Court affirmed these limits, ruling in 
favor of secession only in case of a bilateral approach failure and the closing of all channels of 
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dialogue with the central government.112 In cases like Quebec and Canada, where secession is 
being asked in the framework of a democratic state respecting human rights and the rule of 
law, even a pro-secession majority in a referendum cannot unilaterally lead to such secession. 
Rather, if it materializes, it must be the fruit of a dialectic process with the main government. 
The latter is expected to respect the people’s will and facilitate the process.113 Similar are the 
cases of Catalonia,114 Scotland,115 Gibraltar,116 and Puerto Rico,117 where any pleas of inde-
pendence or autonomy acknowledge the fact that they have to be agreed by the central gov-
ernment through a bilateral process, engaging the central government’s ultimate consent.118 
III. The Inherent Limits of International Law 
A. Tracing International Law’s Limits 
The right to self-determination is an inalienable, erga omnes right.119 It constitutes the 
platform for the exercise of all other rights.120 Nevertheless, even this right is subject to lim-
its. If limits apply to such a cardinal, absolute right, this must be true also for other interna-
tional law notions. In essence, self-determination functions as a paradigm for the ultimate 
exploration of international law’s inherent limits. 
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to have a special status as a non-justiciable article that is used to shed light on the ICCPR’s other 
provisions. See Kitok v. Sweden, Comm. No. 197/1985, ¶ 6.3, ACHPR AAR (Aug. 10, 1988).  
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By definition, law is restricted in its efforts to coordinate social behaviors.121 Courts are re-
strained in providing an effective solution in cases where a political solution is needed.122 For 
example, the European Court of Human Rights has widely resorted to the “margin of appre-
ciation” doctrine, granting state authorities discretion regarding the measures they have to 
take in order for the European Convention’s goals to be met.123 
Even when domestic courts appear to make major breakthroughs, they are quickly en-
trenched in their previous conservative jurisprudence. Thus for example, even though the Is-
raeli Supreme Court has agreed to hear Palestinian petitions and has intervened in security 
projects such as the security fence,124 still on a doctrinal level, the Court has appeared reluc-
tant to question the view of the military commander as far as security issues are con-
cerned.125 Similarly, in the question of the Israeli settlements, the Court has held that a set-
tlement cannot be built on Palestinian private land.126 Yet, the Court has systematically re-
refrained from pronouncing on the legality of the settlements.127 
In U.S. constitutional law, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown v. Board of Education 
was immediately credited as one of the Court’s most groundbreaking decisions.128 Neverthe-
less, the decision, itself, was not able to change things on the ground.129 
Similar to domestic law where limits aspire to safeguard social peace and harmony, in the 
international arena these limits try to ensure global peace and stability. Mimicking the fact 
that limits in domestic jurisdictions are also dictated by other non-positivist parameters, such 
as politics and ideology,130 international law limits equally do not always source from a posi-
tivist duty. 
Often international players engage in or refrain from certain actions because, unconscious-
ly and habitually, they feel they must.131 States comply with international law and respect its 
 
 121. Eric Claes et al., Introduction to FACING THE LIMITS OF THE LAW 1, 12–13 (Eric Claes et al. eds., 
2009). 
 122. See Mattias Kumm, Alexy’s Theory of Constitutional Rights and the Problem of Judicial Review, in 
INSTITUTIONALIZED REASON: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF ROBERT ALEXY 201 (Matthias Klatt ed., 2012); 
ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 341 (2002). 
 123. Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?, 16 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 907 (2005). 
 124. SOLON SOLOMON, THE JUSTICIABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES: THE ADVISORY OPINION ON 
ISRAEL’S SECURITY FENCE AS A CASE STUDY 145 (2009). 
 125. HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Gov’t of Israel, 58(5) PD 807, ¶ 29 [2004] (Isr.); see also 
Guy Davidov & Amnon Reichman, Prolonged Armed Conflict and Diminished Deference to the Mili-
tary: Lessons from Israel, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 919, 921 (2010) (arguing that Israeli courts have 
started limiting deference to the military commander’s discretion). 
 126. DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL AND THE 
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 2, 9 (2002). 
 127. Yuval Shany, Capacities and Inadequacies: A Look at the Two Separation Barrier Cases, 38 ISR. L. 
REV. 230 (2005); Ronen Shamir, “Landmark Cases” and the Reproduction of Legitimacy: The Case of 
Israel’s High Court of Justice, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 781, 788 (1990). 
 128. Carlos A. Ball, The Back-Lash Thesis and Same-Sex Marriage: Learning from Brown v. Board of 
Education and Its Aftermath, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1493 (2006). 
 129. Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us about Constitutional Theory, 90 VA. L. REV. 1537, 1541–42 
(2004); Ruth Gavison, Legislatures and the Quest for a Constitution: The Case of Israel, 11 REV. 
CONST. STUD. 345, 356 n.20 (2006). 
 130. Balkin, supra note 129, at 1538–41. 
 131. Onuma Yasuaki, International Law in and with International Politics: The Functions of Interna-
tional Law in International Society, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 105, 112, 122 (2003); Harold Hongju Koh, 
Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2603 (1997). 
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limits either due to a certain non-explicit cooperation dynamic developed in interstate poli-
tics132 or due to belief in faith values.133 Rooted in something deeper than just the exigencies 
of parochial interests, international norms and their limits acquire a metaphysical facet. They 
become internalized in domestic legal conscience134 and inherent to state behavior. Eventual-
ly, international law’s limits become an inherent element of the international system, because 
they embalm stability, including the restoration of the status quo ante, in cases where global 
order has been transgressed.135 
Such restoration can be achieved either through outer military interventions or through 
the delimitation of the legitimacy of state actions. States must feel there are things they can-
not do without facing legal implications, that certain red lines cannot be crossed.136 Other-
wise, states resort to antagonizing each other. The U.S.-Soviet arms’ race during the Cold 
War,137 the nuclear competition between India and Pakistan,138 and the nuclear aspirations 
of the Arab Sunnite world in response to Iran’s nuclear ambitions139 are all palpable exam-
ples. 
The cases of Libya and Syria have shown that sometimes outer interventions are not so 
easy to take place. As such, international law’s inherent limits become the ultimate hope for 
the preservation of global peace and stability, mirroring the pacta sunt servanda principle, 
which holds that international treaties must be enforced and respected.140 
Although the principle does not apply to non-treaty obligations,141 still, it fosters a certain 
dynamic, with the ability to impact international law. Ultimately, international law’s inher-
ent limits become the political manifestations of basic legal principles, such as that of pacta 
sunt servanda or of bona fides, obliging international actors to try to reach a negotiable rather 
than an imposed solution to their disputes.142 
 
 132. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 3, 109 (1995). 
 133. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 24 (1990); Otto Spijkers, Global 
Values in the United Nations Charter, 59 NETHERLANDS INT’L L. REV. 361 (2012). For the fact that 
non-legal parameters, such as morality, can limit law, see Lawrence Douglas et al., At the Limits of 
Law: An Introduction, in THE LIMITS OF LAW 1, 7 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2005). 
 134. Koh, supra note 131, at 2603. 
 135. Konrad G. Bühler, State Succession, Identity/Continuity and Membership in the United Nations, in 
LA SUCCESSION D’ÉTATS: LA CODIFICATION À L’ÉPREUVE DES FAITS 187, 200 (Pierre Michel Eisemann 
& Martti Koskenniemi eds., 2000). 
 136. See, e.g., K.L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 153 (2005) (dis-
cussing such limits in the GATT adjudication system). 
 137. ANDREW RICHTER, AVOIDING ARMAGEDDON: CANADIAN MILITARY STRATEGY AND NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS 1950–63, at 120 (2002). 
 138. T.V. Paul, The Causes and Consequences of China-Pakistani Nuclear/Missile Collaboration, in 
SOUTH ASIA’S NUCLEAR SECURITY DILEMMA: INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND CHINA 175 (Lowell Dittmer ed., 
2005).  
 139. William J. Broad & David E. Sanger, Eye on Iran, Rivals Pursuing Nuclear Power, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
14, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/14/world/africa/14ihtweb.0415sunnis.5288677.html. 
 140. MARK E. VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 361 
(2009). 
 141. Hartmut Hillgenberg, A Fresh Look at Soft Law, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 499, 510–11 (1999). 
 142. Jean Salmon, 1969 Vienna Convention: Article 26 Pacta Sunt Servanda, in 1 THE VIENNA 
CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 659 (Olivier Corten & Pierre Klein eds., 
2011). For a discussion on the close relationship between good faith and pacta sunt servanda, see 
VILLIGER, supra note 140, at 365 n.26. 
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Of course, non-positivist limits are hard to trace.143 Yet, paradigms of their manifestation 
exist. First, they can be asserted on a cost-benefit analysis, tied to the cost certain policy deci-
sions entail.144 For example, a country can voluntarily denounce a common currency it shares 
with other countries.145 Still, such a decision has disastrous financial consequences for all the 
countries sharing the common currency146 to the extent that in the case of Greece and the Eu-
ro zone, other member countries have done everything they can to avert such a scenario.147 
Second, they can stem from political parameters.148 Thus, Belgium dropped war crimes 
charges against former U.S. Minister of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, once the U.S. threatened 
to move the NATO seat from Brussels.149 Third, they can just constitute a negating pole to a 
new legal reality. States like Belgium and the United Kingdom altered their universal juris-
diction laws once they felt that this legislation had become the vehicle for foreign warring 
parties to begin bringing lawsuits against one another.150 But fourth and more importantly, 
the limits of international law are more clearly felt once legal mechanisms and balances do 
not transmit the essence of omnipotence.151 The importance of this will be discussed in the 
next section. 
B.  The Systemic Placement of International Laws’ Inherent Limits in 
the International Legal System 
The question is what is the practical utility of acknowledging international law’s inherent 
limits? The answer is simple: it systemizes international law. Limits bring order. States do 
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Kaleck et al. eds., 2007). 
 150. Steven R. Ratner, Belgium’s War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 888 (2003); Sarah 
Williams, Arresting Developments? Restricting the Enforcement of the U.K.’s Universal Jurisdiction 
Provisions, 75 MOD. L. REV. 368 (2012). 
 151. Helen Keller, Codes of Conduct and Their Implementation: The Question of Legitimacy, LEGITIMACY 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 219 (Rüdiger Wolfrum & Volker Röben eds., 2008). See also Hans Köchler, 
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not act arbitrarily whenever they want and the in whatever way they want. They take into 
consideration also other states’ reactions.152 Deterrence is being achieved not through mili-
tary means and nuclear armament, but through emphasis on international law’s limits. For 
example, once rumors became more intense that Syria’s Assad was about to use chemical 
weapons against his people, the international community did not try to deter such use by tak-
ing any military actions or any sanctions against the Syrian regime.153 Instead, the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Russia, France and NATO simply reminded Assad that any use 
of chemical weapons would mean the crossing of red lines.154 Consequently, once deterrence is 
achieved through cognizance of international law’s limits, resort to other more coercive meth-
ods, bearing either military or diplomatic cost, is minimized.155 
This is also true for the U.N. Security Council veto power, which has been deemed anach-
ronistic and undesirable156 and has led the five permanent members to be negatively por-
trayed in the eyes of the rest of the international community.157 While it is expected that 
permanent members would continue to exert the veto in order to prevent measures that could 
harm the interests of their ideological and political allies,158 this discretion could be curtailed 
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in major crises where, as aptly put, the international community “could not . . . opt for passiv-
ity.”159 
States, ultimately interested in safeguarding their interests,160 would be more ready to 
forego their veto power if they were reassured that these interests would not eventually be 
harmed.161 Positivist law cannot provide such assurances. Rather, they have to be provided 
by international law’s non-positivist, inherent limits. Only such limits can guarantee that 
states will not appear unrestrained in their actions, in cases where any positivist burdens and 
constraining rules do not apply. 
In essence, international law’s inherent limits politically epitomize mutatis mutandis the 
view held by the International Court of Justice that an international organization can have 
implied powers as long as these powers do not change the distribution of functions inside the 
organization’s realms.162 Initiatives by states should meet implied assertions by the rest of 
the international community as long as they are taken in tandem with the U.N. Charter pro-
visions and procedures163 and do not aspire to change the distribution of regional or global 
balance. This is particularly true in self-determination quests, which by definition entail the 
element of change. 
The limits of international law aspire to balance between such change and the will of 
states to see their interests preserved. As such, the limits of international law are based on a 
deeply balancing concept, totally necessary in the general international constitutional struc-
ture. International constitutionalism164 is built along the pattern of domestic constitutions. 
International constitutionalism is thematic.165 The international constitution must be envi-
sioned as a document, where instead of different articles and provisions, whole legal fields are 
subject to harmonization.166 
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In this interpretational quest and similar to domestic constitutions, the concept of human 
dignity serves as a guiding torch.167 Human dignity indicates both under which lens action 
should be undertaken in the international field, as well as its limits.168 Yet, human dignity 
does not always apply to all international law fields.169 International law needs an explicit 
notion that will be autonomous and serve solely the purpose of halting state action in cases 
where this infringes on other states’ rights and interests. In this aspect, domestic law can 
again provide useful insights. 
In domestic jurisdictions, limitation clauses ordain to the State up to which point it can in-
fringe a certain constitutional right.170 This way the balancing and harmonization of the dif-
ferent constitutional provisions is achieved and constitutional rights are not infringed beyond 
a reasonable extent.171 
Thus for example, Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms states in Section 1 that it 
guarantees these rights and freedoms subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law 
as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.172 South Africa’s constitu-
tion contains a similar provision,173 while Israel’s Basic Law of Human Dignity and Liberty, 
which is deemed to have a constitutional status, prohibits any violation of the contained 
rights except by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose 
and to an extent no greater than is required.174 
In Germany, in absence of a limitation clause, the Federal Constitutional Court has held 
that the unity of the Constitution and the values protected by it dictate constitutional rights 
to be limited.175 In South Africa, Chief Justice Chaskalson eloquently stated that the Su-
preme Court should wage a balance of interests and in this process the nature of the right 
limited as well as its importance to a free and democratic society should be taken into consid-
eration.176 
Courts use limitation clauses in order to, or not to, curtail certain practices according to 
the convictions and beliefs prevalent in their respective societies.177 Any law that questions 
constitutional rights is considered acceptable as long as it does not end up questioning the 
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constitution’s ideological structure. The normative framework is guided by constitutionally 
prescribed values, interpreted by courts.178 
For example, coming to assess the urgency and importance of an initiative which overrides 
constitutionally protected rights, the Canadian Supreme Court looks at whether the initiative 
addresses concerns that are pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society.179 Ul-
timately, limitation clauses are an attempt of the lawmaker to safeguard the existing consti-
tutional and consequently socio-political status quo.180 
On an international level, the inherent limits of international law have the task of main-
taining the global status quo. As such, they function in a way similar to that of limitation 
clauses. They dictate to states up to which point they can take action that can be deemed as 
intrusive to other states’ interests, similar to domestic law on state intrusiveness in individu-
al affairs. 
It is this antithesis, or, in other words, the pulses created by the consecutive contraction 
and expansion of state action, which fills in and perfects the international constitutional pat-
tern.181 In the limitation clause function of international law’s limits, the interpretational 
guide torch of human dignity finds its nemesis, and international constitutionalism gets more 
systemically complete. Ultimately, international law reaches its catharsis. 
IV. Conclusion 
The right to self-determination holds a conspicuous place in contemporary international 
law and constitutes the normative platform for all other rights. Still, it is subject to inherent 
limits which stem from the dialectic approach amongst state and other global actors.182 Uni-
lateral approaches, where the international community intervenes in order to configure the 
right to self-determination according to its dicta and convictions, and without first opening a 
dialogue with all interested parties is sometimes essential in cases where gross human rights 
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violations occur. Yet equally essential is the striking of balance between unilateralism and 
bilateralism. 
Undoubtedly this is not easy.183 Nevertheless, if the unilateral approach to self-
determination is pursued with indiscretion, it can ultimately have negative rather than posi-
tive effects. These negative effects are bound to have an impact both on the people vindicating 
their right to self-determination as well as on the international decision making system. 
A self-determination quest imposed with no subsequent emphasis and international su-
pervision of the international community can easily lead to equally despotic or fragile re-
gimes. Apart from the cases of Egypt and Tunisia, the current note referred also to the cases 
of Kosovo and South Sudan. Moreover, as the case of the Libya military intervention has 
demonstrated, international community efforts to drastically intervene and solve issues of 
self-determination and governance can be successful in the short term. Yet, in the long term, 
such action can weaken the international community’s ability to intervene, even in cases of 
gross human rights violations, like the case of Syria. 
This reluctance of international law to show omnipotence in the securing the right to self-
determination can be compared to similar arteriosclerotic tendencies perceived in domestic 
law. Considering examples of pivotal cases in U.S. and Israeli jurisprudence that failed to 
make the aspired difference on their own, I argued that in essence these limits in the exercise 
of the right to self-determination should be deemed as inherent to international law. In that 
sense, they parallel the limitation clauses in domestic constitutions that indicate the point up 
to which state action is sanctioned. Thus, international thematic constitutionalism is ren-
dered complete and stability is instilled in the international arena. 
This stability is greatly craved-for in a world in turmoil. Eventually, either through the 
gradual relaxing of the veto recourse or through the continuation of the constitutionalization 
process, cognizance of international law’s inherent limits can further entrench trust for the 
international system and its major players: the states. If this is done, the inherent limits will 
not have chained, but liberated international law and the international community at large. 
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